Human information processing is often modeled as costless Bayesian inference. However, research in psychology shows that attention is a computationally costly and potentially limited resource. We study a Bayesian individual for whom computing posterior beliefs is costly. Such an agent faces a tradeoff between economizing on attention costs and having more accurate beliefs. We show that even small processing costs can lead to significant departures from the standard costless processing model. There exist situations where beliefs can cycle persistently and never converge. In addition, when updating is costly, agents are more sensitive to signals about rare events than to signals about common events. Thus, these individuals can permanently overestimate the likelihood of rare events (e.g., the probability of a plane crash). There is a commonly held assumption in economics that individuals will converge to correct beliefs/optimal behavior given sufficient experience. Our results contribute to a growing literature in psychology, neuroscience, and behavioral economics suggesting that this assumption is both theoretically and empirically fragile. * The authors appreciate the helpful comments of
Introduction
Modeling human information processing as Bayesian is standard in cognitive science, neuroscience, and economics: scientists have modeled visual perception as a form of Bayesian inference (Knill and Richards (1996) ); psychologists have argued that babies are "intuitive Bayesians" (Gopnik (2010) ); neuroscience has attempted to investigate how the brain would perform Bayesian inferences (Doya (2007) ); and economists have used Bayesian models to justify other assumptions on agent behavior (Epstein and Le Breton (1993) ).
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The Bayesian actor model assumes not only an ability to update beliefs, but an ability to do so costlessly. In this paper, we examine how Bayesian behavior changes if the costless processing assumption is relaxed. We show that costly information processing can lead to mechanisms such as those posited by "early selection" models in the psychology of attention. We also show that costly information processing has significant consequences for behavior: in some dynamic settings, even small information costs can lead to lack of belief convergence (i.e., permanent belief cycling); in other settings, processing costs can lead agents to converge to incorrect beliefs. Thus, we see that even a small, arguably realistic departure from the standard Bayesian information processing models can lead to significant changes in behavior.
Our setup is simple: We consider an agent who is uncertain about the way the world works. The agent is a Bayesian, and begins with a (prior) probability distribution over possible models of the world. The agent receives "signals" about the true model of the world, and can choose whether to internalize signal information by updating his prior via Bayesian inference. Updating is costly, but internalizing signal information is valuable because it helps the agent solve asset allocation problems that arise each period.
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We show that agents' optimal strategy can be implemented using an elegant algorithm: Upon receiving a signal, agents perform a Bayesian update in a low-dimensional space to compute a "decision value" that determines whether the signal provides enough useful, new information to be worth internalizing. If the signal's decision value exceeds the cost of updating, then agents perform the full Bayesian update. In a world where most signals are not useful, this updating mechanism is an efficient solution to the agent's problem in the sense that it leads to higher payoffs net of processing costs than choosing to always update beliefs.
We consider decisions in both a single period and a dynamic version of our model. We show that when Bayesian updating is costly, agents can exhibit several behaviors that lead to significant departures from the traditional costless Bayesian baseline. First we show that agents can reject a large proportion of signals even if updating costs are very small. Second, we show that when updating is costly, agents are especially attentive to signals suggesting that rare events are more likely than priors suggest; in other words, 1 For example, Bayesian inference is crucial to the common economic modeling assumption that agents have correct expectations regarding how the world functions: a Bayesian exposed to free-flowing information will, in the long run, always learn the true state of the world (see Proposition 3).
2 We focus on the asset allocation problem because it is important in many economic applications and because it has two useful technical features: first, asset allocation is continuous; and second, in asset allocation, better informed agents always have ex-ante higher expected payoffs.
individuals optimally attend more closely to signals that suggest that a rare event is more common than it seems (e.g., hearing about an airplane crash) than to signals that a rare event is, in fact, very rare (e.g., a government report on the general safety of airplanes). In the dynamic version of our model we show that agents can exhibit permanent belief cycling, that is, even as agents receive infinite information, their beliefs need not converge to any single point. Even more starkly, we show that it is easy to construct examples where agents converge to completely incorrect beliefs with probability 1.
Although agents in our model exhibit seemingly irrational behaviors, these behaviors are not a result of "irrationality" on the part of agents. Indeed, agents in our model are always rationally optimizing, given the constraint that Bayesian inference is computationally costly.
There is ample psychological evidence that individuals display seemingly "irrational" patterns of belief updating. However, often these patterns can seem to be at odds with each other. For example, some experiments show that individuals update more conservatively than Bayesian updating would predict (Edwards (1982) )-i.e., they are undersensitive to signals they receive. Other research shows that individuals do not pay enough attention to base rates (Bar-Hillel (1980) ). Finally, a third line of research shows that individuals appear to overweight rare events and underweight common events (Prelec (1998) ). While some of the behaviors just described may seem at odds with each other, our model makes predictions that can rationalize their coexistence: In the presence of updating costs, some kinds of information structures can make agents look conservative, while others can make agents look like they overweight the probability of rare events. Thus costly Bayesian updating provides a principled and unified formulation that can explain why certain biases may exist in some environments and not others.
Our model also explicitly links to the psychology and neuroscience of attention. The optimal strategy for a costly Bayesian updater can be implemented by a system quite similar to those described in the literature on the early selection theory of attention (Pashler and Sutherland (1998) ): First, a fast, parallel system analyzes signals the agent receives and figures out which pieces of information are important enough for internalization. Important signals are then passed on to a slower, serial system for further processing-in this case, Bayesian inference. Thus, agents who must pay costs to perform Bayesian updates can exhibit "cocktail party effects" (Bronkhorst (2000) -experiments on perception show that important ambient signals (e.g., hearing one's name), are readily attended to, while most incoming information is rejected/lost) and "flashbulb memories" (in which certain episodes are recorded much more vividly in memory than others-see Brown and Kulik (1977) ). Finally, our model predicts particular irrationalities in important economic decisions. For example, agents who have little "decision value" from having more accurate beliefs will update less often. This has implications for political decision making-for example, because each individual has near-zero chance of being the marginal voter, there is little incentive to update beliefs about political issues, and we should expect belief traps (i.e., potentially incorrect beliefs that are stable and hard to change) to be quite common.
Alternative constraints on belief processing have been considered in the prior literature. Wilson (2014) characterizes optimal (Markovian) memory protocols for agents that have a finite number of memory modules. In the two-state setting Wilson (2014) considers, an agent optimally associates each memory module with an interval of beliefs and-after observing a signal-transitions to the module whose corresponding interval contains the posterior. Although Wilson (2014) assumes that the agent forgets about the realized history of signals, Wilson (2014) allows the agent to fully introspect on the source of his beliefs by Bayesian updating over all possible signal histories; in our dynamic model, this channel of introspection is shut down. Like us, Wilson (2014) finds that agents should ignore signals that are mildly informative given the prior (see also Compte and Postlewaite (2012) ). Consequently, information processing is "non-commutative" and, in particular, first impressions matter. Contrary to the Wilson (2014) model, however, agents facing information processing costs (as in our model) do not succumb to confirmation bias; rather, they regard evidence opposite to the prior as having higher decision value (see the discussion on belief cycling later in the paper). Steiner and Stewart (2006) study the optimal design of probability perception when there is noisy information at the time of decision making (see also Gossner and Steiner (2016) ). Steiner and Stewart (2006) show that the well-known biases of overweighting small probabilities and underweighting large probabilities arise as a second-best solution to correct for the winner's curse effect. In our framework, agents also face friction in information processing. Yet, rather than holding the friction fixed and analyzing ex-ante perception, we allow agents to repeatedly interact with the friction by choosing which signals to incorporate at a cost and which ones to ignore. Although our prediction that agents pay more attention to rare events bears resemblance to the finding of Steiner and Stewart (2006) , in our context this is because rare events entail higher decision values.
Other models assume that agents have information processing constraints either because they must use one of a finite number of potential learning algorithms (Brock and Hommes (1997) ) or because the amount of information (in a Shannon sense) that they can process is limited (Sims (2003) ). The way our agents sometimes ignore signals is compatible with an attempt to satisfy limited capacity. Note however that any fixed upper bound to information processing becomes non-binding as beliefs approach the extreme, so that a rationally inattentive agent always updates at extreme beliefs. Thus the model of rational inattention cannot produce belief traps of the type we find.
3
Schwartzstein (2014) considers a model in which agents are Bayesian, yet selectively attend only to aspects they believe are important to prediction. With a sufficiently strong (and wrong) prior, a selectively attentive agent may "persistently fail to attend to information even if it would greatly improve forecast accuracy." The bad, self-confirming outcome Schwartzstein (2014) finds largely depends on the fact that the agent internalizes information via a model that is sometimes misspecified. This does not occur in our framework because our agents face processing costs instead of model misspecification.
4 Fryer et al. (2015) introduce a special signal (consisting of a pair of opposite signals) that the agent remembers as favoring his current bias and then updates upon; this leads to double updating and confirmatory bias. In our setting, by contrast, perfectly mixed signals are simply ignored because they have no decision value. explore the dynamic implications of updating with base-rate-neglect. Like us, find that agents do not learn the true state in the long run. Contrary to our belief-trap result, however, agents with base-rate-neglect always assign a non-vanishing weight to the most recent signal, and their beliefs do not converge along any history.
Entropy formulas related to those we find have also appeared in the literature on costly information acquisition. Cabrales et al. (2013b) rank information structures in terms of their value for an investor with increasing CRRA and ruin-averse utility. The Cabrales et al. (2013b) ranking is quantified in terms of the expected reduction in entropy between prior and posterior. The similarity to our results is due to log utility being prominent (see Lemma 2 of Cabrales et al. (2013b) ). However in the Cabrales et al. (2013b) setup, the cost of information is paid ex ante (as an information acquisition cost), whereas the agent in our model sees the signal first and then decides whether or not to pay to update (see also Cabrales et al. (2013a) ; Bergemann and Bonatti (2015) ).
5
Our results are particularly important in the context of equilibrium analysis in economics. A common justification for the focus on equilibrium in many economic models is an argument that equilibria arise as a result of a dynamic learning process (Fudenberg and Levine (1996) ). That is, experience and exposure to information should lead Bayesian agents to converge to optimal behavior/correct beliefs.
6 Our results contribute to a growing literature that suggests that this assumption is both theoretically and empirically fragile and thus unlikely to hold in many real situations (Haruvy and Erev (2002) ; Fudenberg and Peysakhovich (2014) ).
Baseline Setup
We consider an agent who must allocate 1 unit of assets across possible outcomes Ω = {ω 1 , ω 2 , . . . , ω k }. The true outcome is generated by a distribution, denoted by θ * -the (true) model of the world. Our agent's beliefs about the world are based on a set Θ = {θ 1 , θ 2 , . . . , θ n } of (possible) models of the world, which contains the true model, θ * ; the agent has probabilistic beliefs p ∈ ∆(Θ). 7 We assume that the agent does not know the true model θ * but starts with prior beliefs p 0 ∈ ∆(θ) over models of the world putting positive weight on θ
5 Our model is also related to that of Bénabou and Tirole (2002) , in which there is a natural rate λ N of recalling information, but the agent can alter that rate by paying a cost. The theory we present specializes to the case that λ N = 0, with the only possible alteration being perfectly incorporating a signal. We find interesting dynamics unexpected from the static setup of Bénabou and Tirole (2002) . Further papers on belief manipulation include those of Bénabou and Tirole (2004) , Compte and Postlewaite (2004) , and Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) . Papers on memory and recall include those of Mullainathan (2002) , Gennaioli and Shleifer (2010) , and Bordalo et al. (2015) . 6 We do note that recent literature has allowed for individuals to hold incorrect, "self-confirming" beliefs in the long-run about events they do not actually observe (Fudenberg and Levine (1993) ). But in a world of free flowing information, self-confirming equilibria cannot arise. 7 We use the standard notation ∆(X) for the set of probability distributions over set X.
When an outcome actually occurs, the agent gets utility given by u(c i ) where c i is the amount of assets he allocated to outcome i. We use the asset allocation problem as our example because it is simple, has economic meaning in many contexts, and implies a direct value for information. Asset allocation problems like the one we study have been used as idealizations of many types of decision problems. For economic applications, the set of outcomes could be possible returns on bonds and equities; the agent's problem is then to pick an optimal allocation of resources in the market. Asset allocation can also model an agent's choice of an optimal level of insurance or precaution. In these general settings, as well as in our model, an agent who has a more accurate estimate of the true state of the world will always earn a higher payoff in expectation.
Before allocating his assets, the agent receives a signal s drawn from the set S = {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n }. Given a model of the world θ, the probability of a given signal s is λ(θ) [s] .
The final component of our model is our departure from the standard Bayesian agent model: performing Bayesian updating is costly. After seeing a signal s, the agent chooses whether to internalize the signal by updating his prior. Updating requires payment of a (fixed) cost c, and results in the replacement of the prior beliefs p 0 with the posterior beliefs p(s). If the agent does not update, then he pays no cost but the signal information is lost.
We consider first the case of a single period update, this can also be thought of as an agent who makes decisions and updates each period but has a discount rate of δ = 0. After explaining our baseline results, we analyze how they change in a dynamic world with δ > 0.
Optimal Behavior under Costly Updating
For a distribution p on models of the world θ ∈ Θ, we let p Ω ∈ ∆(Ω) be the probability distribution on Ω defined by
that is, the distribution on outcomes implied by p. With this notation, p Ω [ω] is the best estimate of the probability that ω will be the outcome, given beliefs p about the models of the world. Definition 1. The decision value of a signal s, given prior p 0 is For simplicity, from here we assume that the agent has log-utility; that is, consumption of k units is worth log(k) utils. This functional form assumption (combined with the problem setup) drives the functional forms of our results, but not the spirit of the results themselves. Indeed, we think a fruitful set of future work, beyond the scope of this paper, is to provide an axiomatic foundation for utility functions and decision problems which do or do not lead to generalized forms of the pathological behaviors that we find.
The assumption of log utility gives a particularly clear connection between our agent's problem and a well-studied problem in information theory. Indeed, a fundamental question in information theory is determining when two probability distributions on a space are similar or different. This necessitates defining a distance metric and a very commonly used one is Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence (Kullback and Leibler (1951) ), which is defined as follows.
While (1) looks complex, the high-level intuition is straightforward: effectively, KL divergence measures the inefficiency of using distribution Q to approximate distribution P . KL divergence is not a metric in the strict sense, as in general it is not symmetric (that is, D(P || Q) ̸ = D(Q || P )). Nevertheless, KL divergence has proven to be a very useful tool with deep connections to problems in fields from statistics to signal processing to artificial intelligence.
We now show that there is an elegant characterization of the agent's optimal updating strategy in terms of KL divergence.
Proposition 1. Given prior p 0 , signal s and log utility, the agent updates if and only if
is the Kullback-Leibler divergence of the prior from the posterior, and c is the processing cost.
Proof. Recall that in the asset allocation problem with log utility, the first-order conditions set
This means that if the agent uses p Ω 0 to make the allocation decision, he ends up with a true expected utility of
However, if the agent acts optimally and uses the true posterior to make his allocation decision, he has expected utility ∑
Subtracting (2) from (3) yields
which is exactly the KL divergence of the prior from the posterior (projected to Ω space). The result then follows, as the agent internalizes the signal if and only if the expected return from doing so exceeds the cost c.
Proposition 1 tells us the exact conditions under which updating is useful, but computing a decision value itself requires Bayesian updating. How can agents solve this problem? The key here is that the KL divergence only needs to be computed on the projection of the full distribution onto Ω-thus, in some sense the agent only needs to do a "partial" update to check decision values.
We now illustrate how Proposition 1 implies that agents can use a two-step algorithm that is more efficient than full updating so long as Bayesian updating in a larger space is more computationally intensive.
First, we consider (p 0 , Θ, S, Ω, λ), the complete decision space. Given all of the components of the problem described above, a fully Bayesian decision-maker has a distribution µ ∈ ∆(Θ × S × Ω) that fully describes the joint probability of any model, signal and outcome combination. To update this distribution given a signal s, the decision-maker must make some number of computations, which we denote k 1 .
As a different strategy, the decision-maker may instead choose to look at the much lower-dimensional distribution ν that is the projection of µ onto the space (S × Ω). This space is of lower-dimension than (Θ × S × Ω); thus, updating in (S × Ω), given a signal s, is simpler, having processing cost k 2 < k 1 . A strategy to implement the computation of the threshold suggested by Proposition 1 is for the decision-maker to update ν in (S × Ω) and use that posterior to determine whether he should spend the computational resources required to update µ in the full decision space.
In a world where all signals are highly informative and worth internalizing, "gatekeeper" computation of ν is a waste of resources. However, in a world where only a proportion q < 1 of signals are worthwhile, the decision-maker pays an expected updating cost of k 2 + q · k 1 from following the two-step strategy and pays a sure cost of k 1 if he always updates. Thus, if q is small or if k 1 is large relative to k 2 -e.g., if the set of models is large but the set of outcomes is small-then the gatekeeper strategy conserves on computational cost while still allowing the agent to internalize important information.
The "gatekeeper" solution is exactly the kind of system that is set up by early-selection theories in the psychology of attention (Pashler and Sutherland (1998) ). In the models posited in that literature, agents are endowed with two information processing systems, a fast one that can process information in parallel, but only at a cursory level, and a slower one that can look at information more in depth, but must do so serially. In such models, the parallel system screens incoming stimuli. After screening, signals deemed unimportant are ignored (e.g., during a conversation at a cocktail party, the lower level system filters out other conversations), while those deemed important are passed "upstairs" for further processing (as when someone at a party yells the agent's name). This division of labor is a mechanism that can exactly solve our agent's problem: the faster, "gatekeeper" system can compute the decision value and, if need be, push the signal to the slower serial system for internalization.
Of course, one may ask: why not simply always update in the lower dimensional space (S × Ω) and "forget" the existence of (Θ × S × Ω)? Actually, just forming beliefs over the distribution of ω is not sufficient for the agent in a dynamic sense. The issue is that if an agent just maintains beliefs about ω over multiple updates, then this agent would treat signals and outcomes as independent, whereas in fact they are only independent conditional on θ. Consequently, he will learn the wrong distribution in the long run. Nevertheless, forming beliefs over ω is on its own sufficient for a myopic agent to figure out whether to update beliefs over θ. A second, more psychological (or reduced-form) interpretation of Proposition 1 is that the decision value of a signal is more easy accessible than are the signal's implications about the respective likelihoods of different models of the world. For example, a news report about an event (e.g., a plane crash) is informative about both the likelihood of the event (planes crashing) and also about deeper parameters of the world (the safety of the airline industry, the effectiveness of government agencies, and so forth) but the former type of information is more easily cognitively accessible.
We now move on to examples showing how agents with costly updating differ in behavior, sometimes greatly, from their costless Bayesian counterparts.
Example 1: Quantifying Costs
Proposition 1 shows that the addition of updating costs may cause agents to discard some information. We now show, by numerical example, that this effect distorts behavior away from the standard (rational, with perfect updating) baseline model even when processing costs are relatively small.
We consider an example with two possible models of the world, θ 1 and θ 2 , and two possible outcomes, ω 1 and ω 2 . The probability of outcome ω 1 under θ 1 is .9, the probability of outcome ω 1 under θ 2 is .1. The agent has a prior that puts weight p 0 on θ 1 and 1 − p 0 on θ 2 .
8 In this setup, the possible signals s can be characterized by an accuracy level
A signal with accuracy level r = 1 is a signal that θ 1 is definitely the true model of the world; a signal with accuracy level r = 0 is a signal that θ 2 is definitely the true model. We now consider the agent's decision to accept a signal with accuracy level r as a function of his prior. Given a signal of accuracy r, we can compute the agent's value of internalizing the signal. First, we determine the posterior on outcomes implied by the signal:
(.1).
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We then compute the agent's expected loss from using his prior instead of his posterior in his allocation decision. The loss is the Kullback-Leibler divergence between posterior and prior, given by:
Thus, if (4) is bigger than the updating cost c, then the agent should internalize the information; if not, he should discard the signal. Clearly, there is a threshold updating cost c above which the agent ignores the signal and below which the agent updates. However, it is difficult to interpret the magnitude of this threshold without a unit conversion. We scale c to be a fraction of the total possible expected utility gains between a completely informed agent (who has expected utility of .9 log(.9) + .1 log(.1)) and a completely uninformed agent (who has expected utility of log(.5)). That is, c is written as a fraction of the term (.9 log(.9) + .1 log(.1)) − log(.5) ≈ .16. Note that even if c is 10% of the informational value of the problem, the agent will, for any prior, reject signals that have accuracy in the interval [ ]. Thus costly updating has a large distortionary effect on behavior, relative to the costless updating baseline.
Example 2: Attention to Rare Events
Individuals tend to overestimate the probability of rare events like plane crashes and terrorist attacks (see, e.g., Barberis (2013) ). In the behavioral economics literature, this overestimation has been modeled as accidental distortion of probabilities (Kahneman and Tversky (1979) ). Our model, however, suggests a different explanation (not itself incompatible with probability weighting): when updating is costly, agents' beliefs tend to gravitate towards models of the world in which rare events are more common than they actually are.
To see this, consider an example with agents who live in a big city. The agents face a problem that can result in one of two outcomes Ω = {ρ (robbed), σ (safe)}. The agents have two possible models of the world: Θ = {θ s , θ d }. We suppose that θ s (σ) = .99 and θ d (σ) = .8, so that robbery is always rare, but much rarer under θ s than under θ d . We can interpret θ s as a model in which "the city is safe"; θ d is a model in which "the city is dangerous."
We consider two agents who have the same updating cost c. One agent, whom we call Dirk, starts out thinking that the city is dangerous, and the other, whom we call Stephen, starts out thinking that the city is safe. Both agents are equally certain of their (differing) models of the world: Dirk puts prior probability p 0 > .5 on θ d , while Stephen puts prior probability p 0 on θ s . We examine what happens when both agents receive equally strong signals suggesting that their beliefs are wrong. Formally, Stephen receives a signal s d that has accuracy level(times .16).
r < .5 and Dirk receives a signal s s that has the same accuracy level but in the other direction, namely, (1 − r).
Our next result shows that quite generally the value of Dirk's signal is higher than that of Stephen's. Proposition 2 illustrates that, given costly updating, agents who believe that the city is safe-that is, agents who think that rare, dangerous events are very rare-are very responsive to information that suggests otherwise. Meanwhile, agents who believe that rare events are relatively common are not as responsive to equally strong information suggesting that rare events are, in fact, rare.
Note that Proposition 2 is only true if the signal is not strong enough to completely overturn the prior. To see why r cannot be too small, consider the above setup with p 0 = .6 and r = .1 so that Stephen's posterior puts probability 1 7 on θ s . His posterior estimate of the probability of the "safe" outcome is about .827, compared to the prior estimate .914. From Proposition 1, we compute that Stephen's decision value is about .0166. Similarly we can compute that the decision value for Dirk is .0183, higher than Stephen's.
Belief Dynamics
We now explicitly consider the dynamics of our model. Suppose that the true model of the world remains constant throughout. In this setting, the agent starts each period t = 1, 2, . . . with a prior p t−1 , receives a signal s drawn from probability distribution λ(θ * ), and chooses whether to internalize s. The agent then faces the allocation decision outlined in our static model, with beliefs p t =p t−1 (s) if s is internalized, and with beliefs p t = p t−1 if not. The agent then proceeds to the next period, with new prior p t . We assume that the agent discounts future payoffs at rate δ ∈ [0, 1).
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Note that we allow the agent to consider future information value in deciding whether to internalize signals. In particular, the agent could take into account the fact that he may choose not to internalize signals in the future. This kind of sophistication makes it difficult to characterize exactly the decision value of a signal for a patient agent, unlike in the static/myopic case of Proposition 1. In our formal analysis, we show a bound on the total value of a signal by assuming that the agent can internalize all future signals at no cost. We then compare that bound to the cost of internalizing the given signal and establish conditions under which the latter is larger. Consequently, our results extend unchanged regardless of what the agent believes his future selves will do.
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As a benchmark, we consider the case in which there is no updating cost. Here, the agent's behavior is just as in standard Bayesian models.
12
Proposition 3. Suppose that c = 0, that is, that the agent is a standard rational Bayesian. Then with enough experience, the agent learns the true model θ * with certainty:
where the convergence is almost surely.
We now examine the dynamic implications of updating costs. First, we fix an information structure (λ, S) and an updating cost c.
Definition 3.
A belief trap is a probability distribution p ∈ ∆(Θ) such that an agent with prior beliefs p will not internalize any signal s ∈ S.
We say that an agent is in a belief trap if his beliefs p are a belief trap. Note that an agent who starts a period in a belief trap will continue to hold his beliefs forever, irrespective of the signals he receives. Proposition 3 shows that when updating is costless, the only belief trap is the trivial one in which the agent knows the true state with certainty. However, we now show that under very general conditions on the information structure, as long as agents are not perfectly patient (δ < 1), strong beliefs about any possible model of the world become belief traps. 
When δ = 0, so that our agent is myopic, the characterization in Proposition 1 applies, allowing us to show that when ϵ is sufficiently small, no signal generates a decision value exceeding the cost c.
13
When δ > 0, Proposition 1 no longer holds because the updating decision in a given period has repercussions for the future. In the absence of an analytic characterization, we instead give an upper bound on potential future benefits of updating and show it is 11 That said, unlike in the model of Wilson (2014), we do not allow the agent to reflect on how he reaches his current beliefs and perform delayed updating on signals that (he infers) must have been ignored in the past.
12 To make the model nontrivial, we assume that the signal structure is informative, that is for any θ, θ
. 13 We use the full-support condition to bound the difference between posterior and prior distributions.
smaller than c. The method of proof is to choose ϵ much smaller than in the case δ = 0, so that any notable utility gain only happens at least T periods into the future. For large T , these benefits are also negligible because of discounting.
Proposition 4 shows that belief traps are stable sets for belief dynamics under costly updating. However, Proposition 4 does not show that belief traps are attractors. Our next result shows that when updating is costly, beliefs may not even converge -belief dynamics (and thus behavior) can exhibit permanent cycling with probability 1.
We first give some intuition for our results. To simplify the analysis, we restrict to the case of two possible outcomes Ω = {0, 1}, two models Θ = {a, b} (with a being the true model) and two signals, S = {A, B}. To fully specify the decision problem, we need to state the conditional probabilities of outcomes given models and of signals given models. .
We now consider what happens when our agents face the problem dynamically. First, we restrict to myopic agents with δ = 0. Here, the conditions from Proposition 1 are sufficient to tell us whether an agent will update or not, given a signal. Figure 2 shows the decision-value of accepting each of the signals conditional on a current prior. The value of accepting signal A falls quickly as the agent comes to believe that a is very likely; thus, there is a point that the agent stops accepting signal A. For example, if the agent has a decision cost of .07, then the agent will not accept signal A if he believes state a has probability at least .59. Even if the agent were to believe that the state a is .59 likely and he received (and accepted) signal A. he would still only have a posterior probability estimate of ∼ .891. However, at that point he would no longer accept signal A but he would accept signal B. The same argument applies symmetrically for signal B. Thus, there is no way for the agent to get into the region where he stops accepting all signals; hence, the agent will exhibit persistent belief cycling (and so his beliefs will have no definable limit as t → ∞).
This example shows that we can construct decision problems that lead to belief cycling for δ = 0. The next proposition shows that information structures which lead to cycling beliefs can exist for any level of δ and updating cost. 
We note that in the proof of our proposition, we do not explicitly derive the optimal policy. Rather, we bound the utility loss for actions from above. We do not attempt to completely derive the optimal policy for fully sophisticated agents (e.g., using a Bellman (1) doing so is very difficult and (2) we view full sophistication as an abstract benchmark, not a description of actual behavior. We argue that if even maximally sophisticated agents can exhibit belief cycling (or, as we show below, converge to completely incorrect beliefs), then we should also expect similar behaviors in more boundedly rational agents. So far we have shown that it possible for agents to get stuck in belief traps and also for agents to cycle forever. Our final result shows that we can construct decision problems such that no matter how low the agent's updating cost is, his beliefs will eventually converge to a point far away from the true model of the world unless his prior beliefs are very close to the truth. In contrast with the conclusion of Proposition 3, this result exhibits a surprising discontinuity when the updating cost moves away from zero. 
We sketch the intuition behind the proof here. Consider an information structure with two states and two signals as follows:
Suppose that ϵ is very small and λ is very large. In this case, Signal A is very weakly informative that the state is a; hence, its decision value is almost 0, and for a fixed c it can be shown that the agent will simply never accept signal A. At the same time, λ is large, so that signal B is very informative that the state is, in fact, b. Thus, even if the true state is a, the agent will accept only signal B (unless he begins at a prior where he accepts no signals). In a dynamic model, this means the agent will converge to believing b very strongly. Note however, the proposition asserts an information structure that applies to every c. In the limit as c → 0, the preceding argument fails because the agent must accept signal A at some priors. Fortunately, we can still show that signal B is accepted whenever signal A is. That will again imply that the agent converges to the wrong belief b in the long run under costly updating.
Conclusion
We have shown that the addition of processing costs to Bayesian inference leads rational agents to adopt strategies of "pre-screening" signals before fully internalizing them. This causes individuals to ignore some information, and can have distortionary effects on behavior even when costs of processing are small. Additionally, costly processing produces a form of probability overweighting, leading individuals to react more strongly to information suggesting that unexpected events are more common than to equivalently strong information suggesting that common events are rare. Finally, individuals for whom processing is costly can sometimes converge to having arbitrarily strong, but wrong, beliefs even in a world of free-flowing information.
There is a large set of psychological findings on biases in human probability judgment. However, often times the observed biases can appear to be somewhat contradictorye.g., some strands of research show that individuals are conservative (i.e., do not update enough) while others show that individuals can update too much (e.g., ignore base rates or otherwise overweight the likelihood of a rare event). Our model can help to reconcile the range of findings on beliefs because when Bayesian processing is costly there are situations where individuals can be maximally conservative (as when caught in a belief trap), but in other situations they can overweight rare events.
As a general point, we have shown that small changes in the assumptions of the standard Bayesian model give rise to behaviors which are, in both the short-run and in the long-run, large departures from classical Bayesian predictions. Given that standard Bayesian-based learning models are, at best, approximations of human decision-making, such lack of robustness may mean that many standard intuitions gleaned from Bayesianbased models are incorrect. Having better understanding of the kinds of biases human learning actually exhibits (e.g., Bar-Hillel (1980) , Barberis (2013) , Peysakhovich and Karmarkar (2016) , Peysakhovich and Rand (2015) , Fudenberg and Peysakhovich (2014) ) as well as formal theories that explain the cognitive mechanisms which underlie those biases (e.g., Bordalo et al. (2015) , Fryer et al. (2015) , Mullainathan (2002) ) is an important component of building a more robust and applicable model of human information processing.
Lemma 1. For any p, q satisfying .5 ≤ p < q ≤ 1, we have D(p||q) > D(q||p).
Proof. We need to show that p log
The left-hand-side of (5) vanishes when p = q, so it suffices to show that the derivative of that left-hand-side with respect to q is strictly positive. This reduces to verifying
Now, we observe that the left-hand-side of (6) vanishes when p = q and its derivative with respect to p is
< 0. Thus, we have (6) and, consequently, (5); the lemma follows.
Lemma 2. For any ∆ > 0 and any p, q satisfying .5 ≤ p < q ≤ 1 − ∆, we have
Proof. We fix ∆ and show that the expression
strictly increases in p. For the derivative of (7) to be positive, we need to check that
At p = 1 2
, (8) reduces to the easy-to-verify inequality log
Taking the derivative of (8) with respect to p again, it remains to show that
this is true whenever p ≥ .5, and the lemma follows.
Proof of Proposition 2
We let p 
This expression (9) says exactly that the decision value for Stephen is higher than that for Dirk.
Proof of Proposition 3
The likelihood ratio between the true model θ * and any alternative θ conditional on a sequence of observed signals s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s t is given by
Because the signals are i.i.d., generated from the distribution λ(θ * ), it follows from the Strong Law of Large Numbers that
The distributions λ(θ * ) and λ(θ) are different, so their KL-divergence D(λ(θ * ) || λ(θ)) is strictly positive. (10) implies that the likelihood ratio l t converges almost surely to ∞ for every θ ̸ = θ * . Thus, given sufficient experience, the true model θ * (which has non-zero prior probability) will eventually receive near-1 posterior probability.
Proof of Proposition 4
As the information structure has full support, there exists γ > 0 such that λ(θ) [s] ≥ γ for every θ and s. Let M = 1 γ . We observe a simple lemma. Proof. For the proof, it suffices to note that the posterior belief of any model θ ′ ̸ = θ can increase by a factor of at most M relative to the prior. Now, we use the preceding lemma to provide a lower bound on the utility the agent expects if he commits not to update. We assume without loss of generality that all outcomes are possible given the prior p 0 , and denote N ≡ |Ω| < ∞.
In each period t, a non-updating agent forgets the signals he has seen and starts with the same prior p 0 . Because he rejects all signals, the amount he allocates to outcome ω ∈ Ω is always p Ω 0 (ω). His expected payoff in period t is thus
where p Ω 1 is the posterior distribution on outcomes conditional on the signal realized in period t. Lemma 3 implies that for any θ, p 1 (θ) and p 0 (θ) differ by at most M ϵ and by at most a multiple of M . It follows that for any ω, p 
14 The latter step follows from considering the cases p We can also give an upper bound to the agent's total payoff assuming that updating is costless and that the agent can freely choose to update. For this let q t ∈ ∆(Θ) be the posterior that the agent knows about θ after seeing the signal in period t, and let p t be the posterior that he retains. Regardless of the retention decision, q t (θ) ∼ p t−1 (θ) · λ(θ)[s t ] (where s t denotes the signal realized in period t). However p t = q t only when the agent accepts the signal; p t = p t−1 otherwise.
The agent allocates according to p t at the end of period t, for an expected payoff of
where the inequality is due to KL-divergence being non-negative. From Lemma 3 and induction we have p t (θ), q t (θ) ≥ 1 − M t ϵ for each t. Thus the total variation distance between q t and p 0 is at most M t ϵ, which also bounds ||q . For this T , we take ϵ sufficiently small such that
This can be done independently of p Ω 0 because the entropy function is continuous in the total variation norm, hence uniformly continuous (Rudin (1964, Thm. 4.19) ). Making ϵ even smaller if necessary, we may assume that . From (13), the non-negativeness of H(·) and the preceding assumptions, we deduce that the total payoff for a freely updating agent is bounded above by ∑ 
where the last step follows from (12). Now, (14) shows that even when updating is costless, the agent cannot improve her total payoff by c relative to a counterfactual in which she commits not to update. As a corollary, we see that when the updating cost is c, it is never worthwhile to pay the updating cost of c in any period (given any signal); this completes the proof of the proposition. Now take any c < min{V G,r * (p 0 ), V G,r * (η)} (recall r * is fixed). As in the proof of Proposition 5, the interval [0,1] is divided into five subintervals L, CL, C, CR, R. In the leftmost subinterval L and the rightmost subinterval R, the agent rejects both signals. He accepts both signals in the central subinterval C, which may be empty. Finally he accepts s ′ but rejects s * in both CL and CR, due to (18). The choice of c ensures that the initial belief p 0 does not belong to R, and (19) implies that the belief will never enter R (as p cannot jump from C to R). It follows that the agent's belief will almost surely enter L, after a finite number of consecutive s ′ signals. By the choice of c, the final belief is lower than η as desired.
Finally we can extend this argument to a patient agent by making ϵ even smaller, just as we did with the other proofs. A key observation in this setting is that a smaller ϵ not only makes signal s * less informative, but it also makes any s ′ signal more valuable because the agent won't get another one for a long time. We omit the technical details.
